Self-Feeling pp 123-148 | Cite as

The Features of Self-Feeling

  • Gerhard Kreuch
Part of the Contributions to Phenomenology book series (CTPH, volume 107)


The third part presents the main claim of the book. In a nutshell, it argues that self-consciousness must be understood as permeated with affectivity. Self-consciousness is at its core an affective phenomenon, it is self-feeling. Self-feeling is an aspect of our fundamental affectivity. It can be understood as existential feeling. This chapter summarizes the main features of self-feeling building on the first and second part of the book. It is a pre-reflective, pre-propositional, bodily feeling that shapes our space of possibilities. It is the affective disclosure of individual existence. The chapter closes with clarifications to potential questions, such as why it is a feeling, how we can be oblivious of it, if animals can have self-feeling, and if there is one or many self-feelings.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerhard Kreuch
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ViennaViennaAustria

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