Design of a FDIA Resilient Protection Scheme for Power Networks by Securing Minimal Sensor Set

  • Tanmoy Kanti DasEmail author
  • Subhojit Ghosh
  • Ebha Koley
  • Jianying Zhou
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11605)


Recent times have witnessed increasing utilization of wide area measurements to design the transmission line protection schemes as wide area measurements improve the reliability of protection methods. Usage of ICT tools for communicating sensor measurement in power networks demands immunity and resiliency of the associated protection scheme against false data injection attack (FDIA). Immunity against malicious manipulation of sensor information is attainable by securing the communication channels connecting the sensors through cryptographic protocols, and encryption. However, securing all the sensors and communication channels is economically unviable. A practical solution involves securing a reduced set of sensors without compromising fault detection accuracy. With the aim of developing a simple, economically viable and FDIA resilient scheme under the assumption that the adversary has complete knowledge of the system dynamics, the present work proposes a logical analysis of data (LAD) based fault detection scheme. The proposed scheme identifies the minimal set of sensors for FDIA resiliency and detects the state (faulty or healthy) of the power network relying on the measurements received from the ‘minimal sensor set’ only. Validation of the proposed protection scheme on IEEE 9-bus system reveals that in addition to being FDIA resilient, it is reliable and computationally efficient.


Smart grid Transmission line protection False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) Fault detection Partially defined Boolean function (pdBf) Logical analysis of data 



Jianying Zhou’s work was supported by SUTD start-up research grant SRG-ISTD-2017-124.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tanmoy Kanti Das
    • 1
    Email author
  • Subhojit Ghosh
    • 2
  • Ebha Koley
    • 2
  • Jianying Zhou
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Computer ApplicationsNational Institute of Technology RaipurRaipurIndia
  2. 2.Department of Electrical EngineeringNational Institute of Technology RaipurRaipurIndia
  3. 3.Singapore University of Technology and DesignSingaporeSingapore

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