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Formalizing Acquisition Path Analysis

  • Morton Canty
  • Clemens Listner
Chapter
  • 29 Downloads

Abstract

The theory of directed graphs and non-cooperative games is applied to the problem of verification of State compliance to international treaties on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Hypothetical treaty violations are formulated in terms of illegal acquisition paths for the accumulation of clandestine weapons, weapons-grade materials or some other military capability. The paths constitute the illegal strategies of a sovereign State in a two-person inspection game played against a multi- or international Inspectorate charged with compliance verification. The effectiveness of existing or postulated verification measures is quantified in terms of the Inspectorate’s expected utility at Nash equilibrium. A case study involving a State with a moderately large nuclear fuel cycle is presented.

Notes

Acknowledgements

This report was prepared in close cooperation with Irmgard Niemeyer (Forschungszentrum Jülich), Arnold Rezniczek (UBA Unternehmensberatung GmbH, Herzogenrath) and Gotthard Stein (Bonn).

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Copyright information

© This is a U.S. government work and not under copyright protection in the U.S.; foreign copyright protection may apply 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Morton Canty
    • 1
  • Clemens Listner
    • 2
  1. 1.ConsultantJülichGermany
  2. 2.ConsultantBerlinGermany

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