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Hybrids in the French Apple Industry: Opportunistic and Cognitive Differences Between a Cooperative and an Investor-Owned Group

  • Louis-Antoine SaïssetEmail author
  • Jean-Marie Codron
Chapter
Part of the Contributions to Management Science book series (MANAGEMENT SC.)

Abstract

The rising concern of European consumers for pesticides residues left on fruit and of some far distant countries in Asia and Americas for quarantine organisms has turned compliance with SPS requirements into one of the main challenges of the French apple industry. Using transaction cost and cognitive governance theories, we investigate how differences in property rights structures, inter-firm arrangements, and mechanisms of firm governance may impact the modalities of SPS risk management. Our case study of two leading groups of the French fresh apple industry with different property rights structures (cooperative vs. private) and different marketing strategies (customers with more or less stringent SPS requirements) highlight the role of cognitive governance mechanisms (knowledge sharing) in the management of SPS risks. This paved the way for integrating governance structures, cognitive resources, and transaction attributes into a single model.

Keywords

Risk management Governance Cooperative Apple industry Knowledge 

Notes

Acknowledgments

The research leading to this paper has received funding from the French National Research Agency (ANR) under the project Sustain’Apple (2014–2018). We are grateful for the comments received for presentation at the eighth international conference on Economics and Management of Networks that was held in cooperation with the Universidad de la Habana (La Habana, Cuba, November 15–17, 2018). We are grateful to Xavier Vernin (CTIFL, Paris) and Zouhair Bouhsina (INRA, Montpellier) for their participation in data collection and comments. We are also grateful to George Hendrikse and an anonymous reviewer whose comments and criticisms helped us further refine our paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.INRA, UMR MOISA, CIRAD, Montpellier SupAgroMontpellier UniversityMontpellierFrance

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