Moving Beyond Inefficient Policies to Combat Doping

  • Wladimir Andreff
Part of the Palgrave Pivots in Sports Economics book series (PAPISE)


Anti-doping policies refer to standard economics of crime. This chapter stresses on limited efficiency of current recipes to combat doping derived from the standard theory such as the WADA negative list of performance-enhancing drugs on which are based the punishments of detected doping. Inefficiency starts from testing to sanctioning with an extremely low probability for a doped athlete to be detected, then sanctioned. The negative list is inefficient because it sends wrong incentives to athletes and the pharmaceutical industry, and due to a significant time lag between the emergence of a doping innovation and the capacity to test (control) for the new substance. Anti-doping combat meets institutional weaknesses. Game theory suggests a renewal of anti-doping policies. In this framework is suggested a new series of incentives based on each athlete establishing his/her performance-enhancing drugs diary that transform doping into a self-defeating strategy.


Anti-doping policy Inefficiency Economics of crime WADA Negative list Testing Performance-enhancing drugs Sanctions Incentives Detection Pharmaceutical industry Innovation Game theory Self-defeating strategy 


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wladimir Andreff
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre d’Economie de la SorbonneUniversity Paris 1 Panthéon-SorbonneParisFrance

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