Prices and Location: A Geographical and Economic Analysis

  • Walter E. BlockEmail author
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism book series (PASTCL)


Government housing projects, not being part of the profit and loss private sector, are able to transcend the market’s tendency to locate people according to income or wealth. This increases transactions costs, reduces social cooperation, creates inefficiency, and undermines incentives to amass wealth (and thus dis-enhances economic development).


Prices and location Government housing projects Political economic geography Proper legislation in the free society 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Loyola UniversityNew OrleansUSA

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