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Conclusion: Revisiting Norm Entrepreneurship

  • Carmen WunderlichEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Norm Research in International Relations book series (NOREINRE)

Abstract

The finding that “rogue states” can be norm entrepreneurs has consequences for theorizing about norms as well as practical implications for dealing with supposed normative deviants. With regard to the further development of norms research, Wunderlich suggests to analytically distinguish between different forms of norm entrepreneurship, depending on the scope of proactivism. She also suggests to differentiate between reformist and revolutionary norm entrepreneurs, depending on how the respective actor and its normative objectives relate to the prevailing normative order (maintenance, overthrow, or subversion). Regarding the policy toward alleged “rogue states,” Wunderlich warns against sticking to the stigmatizing label. Instead, it might be fruitful to recognize norm-promoting activities by these states and seek out possibilities for common normative ground. The chapter concludes by outlining avenues for further research.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Political ScienceUniversity of Duisburg-EssenDuisburgGermany

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