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Comparing Prototypical and Unorthodox Norm Advocacy

  • Carmen WunderlichEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Norm Research in International Relations book series (NOREINRE)

Abstract

Departing from the finding that Iran—an alleged “rogue state”—acts as a norm entrepreneur in selected policy fields, this chapter seeks to compare such unorthodox norm advocacy with cases of ideal-type norm entrepreneurship as identified by liberal norm scholars. Therefore, Wunderlich contrasts the peculiarities of Iranian norm entrepreneurship with two contrasting cases: A comparison with the prototypical good international citizen, Sweden, serves to reveal differences with regard to the strategies and means used to promote norms. The comparison with North Korea, another state typically alleged of violating global norms, is intended to allay the suspicion that the concept of norm entrepreneurship can be applied to all kinds of actors. In addition, it helps answer the question under what circumstances resistance to the ruling order might transform into activism or isolationism.

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Political ScienceUniversity of Duisburg-EssenDuisburgGermany

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