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Trustbusters

  • Li Way Lee
Chapter

Abstract

Antitrust agencies patrol the main streets and the back alleys of industries in search of violations of antitrust laws. I review the two main forms of antitrust violation: structural and behavioral. In the second half of the chapter, I turn to tactics that managers use to evade and thwart antitrust agents. The tactics belong to four categories: structural, behavioral, legal, and “capturing.” Before closing, I suggest that trustbusters and managers always have the option of changing the game that they play: stop fighting and go for arbitration. That is, they may seek regulation instead. This suggests that antitrust and regulation are two sides of the same coin.

Keywords

Antitrust Structural targets Behavioral targets Capture 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Li Way Lee
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsWayne State UniversityDetroitUSA

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