Responses to the Welfare Problems

  • John HadleyEmail author


In this chapter I present two theories that stand as putative solutions to the problems of welfare. The two theories are experiential pluralism and expressivism. Experiential pluralism is the view that there are feelings other than pleasure and pain that can impact upon the welfare of an individual. Pluralists can avoid the charge of changing the subject by claiming their view is aligned with the feelings-centred welfare orthodoxy by remaining experientially-focused. Expressivism is a theory of moral language use. In line with expressivism, ethical claims are analysed as simply the expression of the emotions or attitudes of the speaker. Expressivists avoid the charge of changing the subject because, in line with expressionism, when a person uses rights-based terms such as dignity and respect, they are not singling out for ethical attention a consideration that is outside the scope of the welfare orthodoxy.


Pluralism Expressivism Hedonism Deliberative democracy Animal welfare Pain Welfare 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Western Sydney UniversityPenrithAustralia

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