A Political Philosophy of Public Goods

  • Thilo ZimmermannEmail author


In order to make public good theory applicable to the republican discourse, it needs to be revised. This chapter illustrates especially the dichotomy and definition problem of public good theory. The dichotomy problem is solved by combining public good theory with political philosophy. The classical public good characteristics of non-excludability and non-rivalry are now derived, building on Searle’s social constructivism, from the characteristics of a mental and a material word. Building on this new viewpoint of public good theory, the concept of a hierarchy of nested social institutions and public goods is developed that needs to be delivered by a sovereign. This approach allows to combine economic and political science theory and to explain European integration under the republican viewpoint of a res publica of public goods.


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© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CologneGermany

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