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Gavel: A Sanctioning Enforcement Framework

  • Igor Conrado Alves de LimaEmail author
  • Luis Gustavo Nardin
  • Jaime Simão Sichman
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11375)

Abstract

Sanctioning is one of the most adopted enforcement mechanisms in the governance of multiagent systems. Current enforcement frameworks, however, restrict agents to reason about and make sanctioning decisions. We developed the Gavel framework, an adaptive sanctioning enforcement framework that enables agents to decide for the most appropriate sanction to apply depending on various decision factors. The potential benefits and use of the framework are shown using a Public Goods Game in which agents are endowed with different strategies combining material and reputational sanctions.

Keywords

Enforcement system Normative Multiagent Systems Software engineering 

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Igor Conrado Alves de Lima
    • 1
    • 3
    Email author
  • Luis Gustavo Nardin
    • 2
  • Jaime Simão Sichman
    • 3
  1. 1.Inst. de Matemática e EstatísticaUniversidade de São PauloSão PauloBrazil
  2. 2.Department of InformaticsBrandenburg University of TechnologyCottbusGermany
  3. 3.LTI, Escola PolitécnicaUniversidade de São PauloSão PauloBrazil

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