Dynamic Global Behaviour of Online Routing Games

  • László Z. VargaEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11375)


In order to ensure global behaviour of decentralized multi-agent systems, we have to have a clear understanding of the issue of equilibrium over time. Convergence to the static equilibrium is an important question in the evolutionary dynamics of multi-agent systems. The evolutionary dynamics is usually investigated in repeated games which capture the evolutionary dynamics between games. The evolutionary dynamics within a game is investigated in online routing games. It is not known if online routing games converge to the static equilibrium or not. The progress beyond the state-of-the-art is that we introduce the notion of intertemporal equilibrium in the study of the evolutionary dynamics of games, we define quantitative values to measure the intertemporal equilibrium, we use these quantitative values to evaluate a realistic scenario, and we give an insight into the influence of intertemporal expectations of the agents on the intertemporal equilibrium. An interesting result is that the prediction service, which is engineered into the environment of the multi-agent system as a novel type of coordination artifact, greatly influences the global behaviour of the multi-agent system. The main contribution of our work is a better understanding of the engineering process of the intertemporal behaviour of multi-agent systems.


Agent-based and multi-agent systems Agent theories and models Coordination artifacts Environment engineering 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of InformaticsELTE Eötvös Loránd UniversityBudapestHungary

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