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Cryptanalysis of an NTRU-Based Proxy Encryption Scheme from ASIACCS’15

  • Zhen Liu
  • Yanbin Pan
  • Zhenfei ZhangEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11505)

Abstract

In ASIACCS 2015, Nu\(\tilde{\mathrm{n}}\)ez, Agudo, and Lopez proposed a proxy re-encryption scheme, NTRUReEncrypt, based on NTRU, which allows a proxy to translate ciphertext under the delegator’s public key into a re-encrypted ciphertext that can be decrypted correctly by delegatee’s private key. In addition to its potential resistance to quantum algorithm, the scheme was also considered to be efficient. However, in this paper we point out that the re-encryption process will increase the decryption error, and the increased decryption error will lead to a reaction attack that enables the proxy to recover the private key of the delegator and the delegatee. Moreover, we also propose a second attack which enables the delegatee to recover the private key of the delegator when he collects enough re-encrypted ciphertexts from a same message. We reevaluate the security of NTRUReEncrypt, and also give suggestions and discussions on potential mitigation methods.

Keywords

NTRUReEncrypt NTRU Decryption failure Reaction attack Key recovery 

Notes

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank David Nuñez for his helpful discussions.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Key Laboratory of Mathematics Mechanization, NCMIS, Academy of Mathematics and Systems ScienceChinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  2. 2.State Key Laboratory of CryptologyBeijingChina
  3. 3.School of Mathematical SciencesUniversity of Chinese Academy of SciencesBeijingChina
  4. 4.AlgorandBostonUSA

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