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Recovering Short Secret Keys of RLCE in Polynomial Time

  • Alain Couvreur
  • Matthieu LequesneEmail author
  • Jean-Pierre Tillich
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11505)

Abstract

We present a key recovery attack against Y. Wang’s Random Linear Code Encryption (RLCE) scheme recently submitted to the NIST call for post-quantum cryptography. The public key of this code based encryption scheme is a generator matrix of a generalised Reed Solomon code whose columns are mixed in a certain manner with purely random columns. In this paper, we show that it is possible to recover the underlying structure when there are not enough random columns. The attack reposes on a distinguisher on the dimension of the square code. This process allows to recover the secret key for all the short key parameters proposed by the author in \(O(n^5)\) operations. Our analysis explains also why RLCE long keys stay out of reach of our attack.

Keywords

Code based cryptography McEliece scheme RLCE Distinguisher Key recovery attack Generalised Reed Solomon codes Schur product of codes 

Notes

Acknowledgements

The authors are supported by French Agence nationale de la recherche grants ANR-15-CE39-0013 Manta, ANR-17-CE39-0007 CBCrypt and by the Commission of the European Communities through the Horizon 2020 program under project number 645622 (PQCRYPTO). Computer aided calculations have been performed using softwares Sage and Magma [5].

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alain Couvreur
    • 1
  • Matthieu Lequesne
    • 2
    • 3
    Email author
  • Jean-Pierre Tillich
    • 3
  1. 1.Inria and LIX, CNRS UMR 7161 École polytechniquePalaiseau CedexFrance
  2. 2.Sorbonne Université, UPMC Univ Paris 06ParisFrance
  3. 3.InriaParisFrance

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