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Quantum Security of Hash Functions and Property-Preservation of Iterated Hashing

  • Ben HamlinEmail author
  • Fang SongEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11505)

Abstract

This work contains two major parts: comprehensively studying the security notions of cryptographic hash functions against quantum attacks and the relationships between them; and revisiting whether Merkle-Damgård and related iterated hash constructions preserve the security properties of the compression function in the quantum setting. Specifically, we adapt the seven notions in Rogaway and Shrimpton (FSE’04) to the quantum setting and prove that the seemingly stronger attack model where an adversary accesses a challenger in quantum superposition does not make a difference. We confirm the implications and separations between the seven properties in the quantum setting, and in addition we construct explicit examples separating an inherently quantum notion called collapsing from several proposed properties. Finally, we pin down the properties that are preserved under several iterated hash schemes. In particular, we prove that the ROX construction in Andreeva et al. (Asiacrypt’07) preserves the seven properties in the quantum random oracle model.

Keywords

Quantum random-oracle model Post-quantum security definitions Hash functions 

Supplementary material

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Texas A&M UniversityCollege StationUSA

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