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On Lions and Elligators: An Efficient Constant-Time Implementation of CSIDH

  • Michael MeyerEmail author
  • Fabio Campos
  • Steffen Reith
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11505)

Abstract

The recently proposed CSIDH primitive is a promising candidate for post quantum static-static key exchanges with very small keys. However, until now there is only a variable-time proof-of-concept implementation by Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny, and Renes, recently optimized by Meyer and Reith, which can leak various information about the private key. Therefore, we present an efficient constant-time implementation that samples key elements only from intervals of nonnegative numbers and uses dummy isogenies, which prevents certain kinds of side-channel attacks. We apply several optimizations, e.g. Elligator and the newly introduced SIMBA, in order to get a more efficient implementation.

Keywords

CSIDH Isogeny-based cryptography Post-quantum cryptography Constant-time implementation 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by Elektrobit Automotive, Erlangen, Germany. We thank Joost Renes for answering some questions during the preparation of this work, and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful and valuable comments.

Supplementary material

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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of Applied SciencesWiesbadenGermany
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsUniversity of WürzburgWürzburgGermany

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