A Comparison of Leaders’ Capabilities and Their Resources

  • Billur Aslan Ozgul
Part of the Palgrave Studies in Young People and Politics book series (PSYPP)


The purpose of this chapter is to compare the capabilities of the leaders and the organisational structure of these in Egypt and Syria. To enable a rigorous assessment of how leaders use the communication tactics in different political and social contexts and their capabilities during protests, the multi-layered framework outlined by Agarwal et al. (2014) is used. This model tests three capability dimensions in today’s movements: resource mobilisation; responsiveness to external conditions; and long-term adaptation, change or decline. Applying this framework, here, I also aim to test the organisational structure of the Egyptian and Syrian protests and question whether these fit into any of the three models that Bennett and Segerberg (2013) define in their book, “The Logic of Connective Action”, namely crowd-enabled connective action, organisationally enabled connective action and organisationally brokered connective action.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Billur Aslan Ozgul
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Social and Political SciencesBrunel University LondonLondonUK

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