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Affect and Authenticity: Three Heideggerian Models of Owned Emotion

  • Denis McManusEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Philosophers in Depth book series (PID)

Abstract

This chapter explores the notion of an authentic affective life by examining three models of Heideggerian authenticity in light of his remarks on emotion. In addition to the familiar “decisionist model,” the chapter examines what I call the “standpoint model” and the “all things considered judgment model” (AJM). Each of these models suggests a distinctive picture of what authenticity in one’s affective life might be, and considering the plausibility of these pictures provides an interesting way to re-consider the plausibility of those models. The chapter argues that authentic affect as the decisionist model understands it requires a level of control over our emotions that is inherently implausible and incompatible with Heidegger’s understanding of them, and that the standpoint model’s understanding of authentic affect requires a uniformity in our emotions which should be rejected on the same grounds. Ultimately, the chapter argues in favor of the AJM on the grounds that its picture of affective authenticity—an openness to the many ways in which my situation matters to me, touches me and moves me whether I like it or not—is both truer to our actual emotional lives and more harmonious with Heidegger’s own understanding of these matters.

Keywords

Authenticity Emotion Decisionism Standpoint Judgment 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of SouthamptonSouthamptonUK

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