Argument from Arbitrary Limits
In this piece, Rasmussen takes a step back to see some of the larger issues at stake. He begins by separating certain versions of theism from a more fundamental, core ontology. By seeing this core, Rasmussen hopes to remove unnecessary barriers to a more unifying vision of the foundation of existence, a vision that sets the stage for the rest of the inquiry. Rasmussen also addresses Leon’s worry about the limits of the problem of arbitrary limits. Here, Rasmussen proposes a non-arbitrary terminus for explanation seeking. To conclude the chapter, Rasmussen reviews some things he has learned from this first section of the exchange. Here, Rasmussen displays some of the fruits of a peaceful, productive inquiry into the deepest part of existence.
KeywordsArbitrary limits Natural causes Material causation Supreme foundation
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