How the Best of Naturalism Fits Inside a Foundational Mind

  • Joshua Rasmussen


This chapter wraps up core themes in this exchange about a foundational mind. In the spirit of productive inquiry, Rasmussen seeks to highlight the value of Leon’s points toward filling out the best vision of an ultimate foundation capable of producing beings like us. Rasmussen reviews the arguments on the table and then addresses Leon’s latest concerns. A theme in Rasmussen’s response is that a remarkably unified vision can emerge by the separation of theories. We can steer through the thorns to find in Leon’s own vision core elements that a personal foundation (broadly conceived) would include. A result of this chapter, proposes Rasmussen, is that the core resources of a foundational mind shine through ever more brightly on closer examination.


Complex adaptive system Divine conceptualism Platonism Russell’s propositions paradox 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joshua Rasmussen
    • 1
  1. 1.Azusa Pacific UniversityAzusaUSA

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