About the Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games with Transferable Utility

  • Ovanes PetrosianEmail author
  • Ildus Kuchkarov
Part of the Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications book series (SDGTFA)


This paper presents a complete description and the results of the Looking Forward Approach for cooperative differential games with transferable utility. The approach is used for constructing game theoretical models and defining solutions for conflict-controlled processes where information about the process updates dynamically or for differential games with dynamic updating. It is supposed that players lack certain information about the dynamical system and payoff function over the whole time interval on which the game is played. At each instant, information about the game structure updates, players receive new updated information about the dynamical system and payoff functions. A resource extraction game serves as an illustration in order to compare a cooperative trajectory, imputations, and the imputation distribution procedure in a game with the Looking Forward Approach and in the original game with a prescribed duration.


Differential games Differential cooperative games Looking forward approach Time consistency 



Research was supported by a grant from the Russian Science Foundation (Project No 18-71-00081).


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.St. Petersburg State UniversitySt. PetersburgRussia
  2. 2.National Research University Higher School of Economics at St. PetersburgSt. PetersburgRussia

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