Hubris of Transcendental Idealism
Abstract
Patočka’s phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, creatively transforms Husserl’s concept of Lebenswelt. The chapter demonstrates the originality of Patočka’s approach. I summarize Patočka’s analysis of the natural world to focus on the concept of transcendental subjectivity. How can this subjectivity be achieved by a finite consciousness and, even more importantly, what is this subjectivity? Elaborating on Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Patočka identifies the concrete concept of constituting subjectivity with that of “monads” intermeshing with one another. I suggest interpreting this concept as pointing to trans-individual process of life embodied by the monads ontologically grounding the world.
Keywords
Edmund Husserl Freedom Intersubjective constitution Jan Patočka Lifeworld Phenomenology of life Transcendental idealism Transcendental reflectionReferences
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