Resilience to What? EU Capacity-Building Missions in the Sahel

  • Luca RaineriEmail author
  • Edoardo Baldaro


This chapter proposes an in-depth analysis of the three CSDP missions currently deployed in Mali and Niger, in order to shed light on the European initiatives for fostering resilience in the Sahel. Focusing on the security sector, the analysis considers the shared context of the origin of the missions, and it examines their evolution and their mixed performances. It suggests that the EU mainly conjugates resilience in terms of sector-specific, quick-impact measures of capacity-building targeting local states and security forces. Consequently, the EU tends to overestimate the size of external shocks while it underrates local fragilities, thereby undermining the potential impact of its efforts for stabilisation.


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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Sant’Anna School of Advanced StudiesPisaItaly
  2. 2.University of Naples “L’Orientale”NaplesItaly

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