Moral Properties

  • Christopher B. KulpEmail author


I argue for a realist conception of moral properties in general, and first-order moral properties in particular. Properties are abstract, platonic universals which may or may not be instantiated, or instantiable, in concrete or abstract particulars. The concept of a possible world—an imaginary ordered-set of compossible properties—is used to elucidate a realist conception of moral truth, moral facts, and moral properties. On our view, truth—including first-order moral truth—is truth relative to one very special possible world, viz., the actual world. The chapter ends with an analysis and critique of moral naturalism, and develops a version of moral non-naturalism, which includes a defense of the gradeablity of first-order moral properties.


Moral properties First-order Platonic universals Abstract particulars Possible world Moral naturalism Moral non-naturalism Gradeability 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySanta Clara UniversitySanta ClaraUSA

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