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Propositions and the First-Order Moral

  • Christopher B. KulpEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

Propositions are abstract entities that express the content of declarative sentences, and serve as truth-bearers. Moral non-cognitivists deny that first-order moral discourse is propositional, hence is neither true nor false, while moral cognitivists hold that first-order moral discourse is propositional. Commonsense morality is cognitivist, as is the metaethical theory to which it is committed, viz., moral realism. I argue that moral realists are correct. First-order moral discourse mirrors most of the features of non-moral discourse: the conditions for meaningfulness are similar; their internal structures are similar; their formal characteristics are similar; they function similarly in arguments; etc. Cognitivists are on much firmer ground than non-cognitivists in their respective analyses of moral discourse.

Keywords

Propositions Declarative sentences Truth-bearers Cognitivism Moral realism Meaningfulness Moral discourse 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySanta Clara UniversitySanta ClaraUSA

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