Non-majoritarian Institutions, Conditionality and Domestic Reform

  • Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos
  • Argyris Passas


The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it places this reform in its broader context, i.e. the increasing use of non-majoritarian institutions and executive agencies that operate at arm’s length from the government in advanced liberal democracies (and beyond). This reform exemplifies this trend. The key element of this reform—and the central idea behind it—is the notion of depoliticisation. The first section of this chapter explores this notion. The second section discusses the logic that underpins the increasing use of these institutions, and then highlights their limitations, especially in terms of design, accountability and effectiveness. The chapter’s second purpose is to set out the logic of the key tool (conditionality) used for the purpose of bringing about this domestic reform in Greece. The final section discusses the logic of conditionality, sets out its main characteristics in the European Union’s context and then presents the three hypotheses that are examined empirically in the remainder of this book.


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Authors and Affiliations

  • Dionyssis Dimitrakopoulos
    • 1
  • Argyris Passas
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PoliticsBirkbeck, University of LondonLondonUK
  2. 2.Department of International, European and Area StudiesPanteion University of Social and Political SciencesAthensGreece

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