Collective Action in the Wild

  • Mathew D. McCubbins
  • Mark TurnerEmail author
Part of the Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology book series (PEPRPHPS, volume 23)


Twentieth-century dispositions to model human cognition as logical systems have been undermined by evidence from the wild. Formal models of cognition as symbolic, algorithmic, internally consistent, disembodied, and sequentially marching through linear inference are not ecologically valid and are being replaced by pragmatic, usage-based theories, most notably in linguistics. In this article, we argue that game-theoretic models of human collective action must find new foundations, given the evidence that human behavior in experimental settings and in the wild does not conform to theoretical predictions. We propose an alternative, pragmatic theory of decision-making, founded on different conceptions of selves and decisions, conceptions that are consistent with new cognitive neuroscience.


Decision-making Game theory Predictability Performativity 


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political Science and School of LawDuke UniversityDurhamUSA
  2. 2.Case Western Reserve UniversityClevelandUSA

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