Game Equilibria and Transition Dynamics with Networks Unification
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the Nash equilibrium amount of investment in knowledge when one of the complete graph enters another full one. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how game agents will behave when deciding whether to enter the other net, what conditions and externalities affect it and how the level of future equilibrium amount of investments in knowledge can be predicted.
KeywordsNetwork Network game Nash equilibrium Externality Productivity Innovation cluster
The research is supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (project 17-06-00618).
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