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Non-cooperative Game Based Carbon Emission Reduction for Supply Chain Enterprises with a Cap and Trade Mechanism

  • Min Wang
  • Shuhua Hou
  • Rui QiuEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 1002)

Abstract

With the increasing attention of society to the environmental issues, carbon emission rights have become a new type of resource with certain commercial value, which has changed the production function and cost structure of the original enterprises. In the course of operation, enterprises have increased the consideration of carbon emission rights from the original focus on “raw materials and products (services)”. Therefore, based on the carbon and trade mechanism, this paper deeply explores the decision-making of carbon emission reduction of the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain and the choice of government carbon quota allocation scheme under the constraint of government carbon emissions, and uses game theory knowledge to analyze the effect of carbon emission reduction of upstream and downstream enterprises under the non-cooperative game. The results show that the emission reduction effect of the government’s carbon quota per unit of product allocation is more obvious than that of the direct total amount restriction, and it is beneficial for sustainability of supply chain systems.

Keywords

Cap and trade mechanism Supply chain enterprises Supply chain Non-cooperative Sustainability 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research has been supported by the project of Research Center for System Sciences and Enterprise Development (Grant No. Xq18B02), Sichuan University (Grant No. 2018hhf-45), and China Scholarship Council (Grant No. 201806240126).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Business SchoolSichuan Agricultural UniversityDujiangyanPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.Business SchoolSichuan UniversityChengduPeople’s Republic of China
  3. 3.School for Environment and SustainabilityUniversity of MichiganMichiganUSA

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