Knowing How and the Semantics/Pragmatics Debate

  • Alessandro Capone
Part of the Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology book series (PEPRPHPS, volume 22)


In this chapter, I deal with know how vs. know that from a linguistic point of view and I point out a number of pragmatic inferential phenomena. It is of some interest that this is a chapter in which linguistics and philosophy intersect and that a linguistic treatment of inferential behavior has to be provided in an illuminating way for philosophy. I mainly use and develop ideas by Stanley and Williamson (J Philos 2001).


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alessandro Capone
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Cognitive ScienceUniversity of MessinaMessinaItaly

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