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A Steady-State Game of a Net-Zero Emission Climate Regime

  • Olivier BahnEmail author
  • Alain Haurie
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 280)

Abstract

In this paper we propose a very simple steady-state game model that represents schematically interactions between coalitions of countries in achieving a necessary net-zero emission of GHGs in order to stabilize climate over the long term. We start from a situation where m coalitions exist and behave as m players in a game of sharing a global emission budget that can only be maintained by negative emission activities. We compare a fully “cooperative” solution with a Nash equilibrium solution implemented through an international emission trading scheme. We characterize the fully cooperative and Nash equilibrium solutions for this game in a deterministic context.

Keywords

Carbon capture and storage Carbon dioxide removal Climate change Mitigation Integrated assessment Steady-state game 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This research has been supported by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (O. Bahn) and the Qatar National Research Foundation (A. Haurie).

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.GERAD and Department of Decision SciencesHEC MontréalMontréalCanada
  2. 2.ORDECSYSChêne-BougeriesSwitzerland
  3. 3.University of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland
  4. 4.GERADHEC MontréalMontréalCanada

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