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What Should We Do in the Face of Epistemic Peer Disagreement?

  • Andrea Robitzsch
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 411)

Abstract

In the previous chapter, I have introduced an E-RULE approach to epistemic responsibility assessment. I have argued that this doxastic responsibility assessment is epistemically significant because it is governed by certain epistemic norms, namely the norms of reliable intellectual conduct. Moreover, I have argued that the performance of belief-influencing actions and omissions which are licensed by the norms of reliable intellectual conduct conduces to produce epistemic value. In this chapter, I want to put to work what has been said about the epistemic significance of the norms of reliable intellectual conduct and epistemic responsibility assessment. In what follows, I want to apply what has been said in the previous chapter to the debate about the epistemic significance of epistemic peer disagreement. In what follows EPD will refer to epistemic peer disagreement.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Andrea Robitzsch
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OsnabrückOsnabrückGermany

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