Advertisement

An Almost Pure Theory of Legal Interpretation within Legal Science

  • Jorge Silva SampaioEmail author
Chapter

Abstract

The purpose of this article is primarily to shed some light on the question of what we mean by interpretation, to assess whether or not legal interpretation is a scientific operation and whether or not it is possible to obtain legal knowledge in a scientific manner. For this endeavour, firstly, I will lay out a conceptual framework of law and legal science—a soft normativist model. Secondly, I will outline the basis of my theory of legal interpretation, in which I will argue, among other things, for a broad conception of legal interpretation (even if one may distinguish between noetic and dianoetic interpretations), that its object is composed of legal formulations (linguistic conception); that law is only partly or locally indeterminate, which guarantees a high level of scientificity in the cases of determination; and that interpretation is a norm-guided operation involving language rules and legal interpretative norms. Thirdly, I conclude that legal knowledge can be scientific, especially in cases of legal determinacy—clear cases—that it is also possible to make truth propositions about law and that, accordingly, sometimes there is also legal objectivity.

Keywords

Legal interpretation Legal knowledge Legal science Objectivity Determinacy Easy and hard cases Normative propositions 

References

  1. Aarnio A (1987) The rational as reasonable. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  2. Alchourrón C, Bulygin E (2012) Sistemas Normativos, 2ª ed. Astrea, Buenos AiresGoogle Scholar
  3. Alexy R (1999) The special case thesis. Ratio Juris 12(4):374–384CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Alexy R (2003) On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison. Ratio Juris 16(4):433–449CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Alexy R (2010a) A theory of constitutional rights. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  6. Alexy R (2010b) A theory of legal argumentation. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  7. Altman A (1990) Critical legal studies: a liberal critique. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  8. Atienza M, Manero JR (2007) Dejemos atrás el positivismo jurídico. Isonomía 27:7–28Google Scholar
  9. Banaś P (2015) Legal interpretation as a rule-guided phenomenon. In: Araszkiewicz M et al (eds) Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  10. Barberis M (2000) Lo scetticismo immaginario. Nove obiezioni agli scettici à la génoise. Analisi e diritto. Giappichelli, Torino, pp 1–36Google Scholar
  11. Barberis M (2002) Interpretar, aplicar, ponderar. Nueve pequeñas diferencias entre la teoría genovesa y la mia”. In: Diritto e questioni pubbliche, pp 533–557Google Scholar
  12. Bayón JC (2003a) Proposiciones normativas e indeterminación del derecho. In: Bayón JC, Rodríguez JL (ed) Relevancia normativa en la justificación de las decisiones judiciales. Universidad Externado de Colombia, BogotáGoogle Scholar
  13. Bayón JC (2003b) ¿Por qué es derrotable el razonamiento jurídico? In: Bayón JC, Rodríguez JL (eds) Relevancia normativa en la justificación de las decisiones judiciales. Universidad Externado de Colombia, BogotáGoogle Scholar
  14. Beltrán JF (2012) El Error Judicial y los Desacuerdos Irrecusables en el Derecho. In: Luque Sánchez P, Ratti GB (eds) Acordes y Desacuerdos – Cómo y por qué los juristas discrepan. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  15. Bix B (1993) Law, language and legal determinacy. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  16. Black M (1954) Problems of analysis. Routledge & Kegan Paul, LondonGoogle Scholar
  17. Brozek B (2004) Defeasibility of legal reasoning. Zakanycze, KrakówGoogle Scholar
  18. Bulygin E (1991) El concepto de vigencia en Alf Ross. In: Carlos E (ed) Alchourrón y Eugenio Bulygin, Análisis lógico y derecho. CEC, MadridGoogle Scholar
  19. Bulygin E (1992) Sull’interpretazione. Analisi e Diritto. Giappichelli, Torino, pp 257–277Google Scholar
  20. Bulygin E (1999) True or false statements in normative discourse. In: Egidi R (ed) In search of a new humanism – the philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  21. Bulygin E (2015a) Judicial decisions and creation of law. In: Bulygin E (ed) Essays in legal philosophy. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Bulygin E (2015b) The objectivity of the law. In: Bulygin E (ed) Essays in legal philosophy. OUP, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Burazin L, Himma KE, Roversi C (eds) (2018) Law as an artifact. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  24. Canale D (2012) Teorías de la interpretación jurídica y teorias del significado. Discusiones 11:135–165Google Scholar
  25. Chiassoni P (2011) Técnicas de interpretación jurídica – Breviario para juristas. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  26. Chiassoni P (2013) Normativismo ingenuo v. normativismo crítico. Analisi e diritto. Marcial Pons, Madrid, pp 33–44Google Scholar
  27. Chiassoni P (2016) The pragmatics of scepticism. In: Analisi e Diritto. Marcial Pons, Madrid, pp 275–303Google Scholar
  28. Coleman J, Leiter B (1997) Determinacy, objectivity and authority. In: Marmor A (ed) Law and interpretation: essays in legal philosophy. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  29. Comanducci P (2010) Democracia, Derechos e Interpretación Jurídica – Ensayos de Teoría Analítica del Derecho. Ara Editores, LimaGoogle Scholar
  30. Davidson D (1984) Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  31. Dickson J (2001) Evaluation and legal theory. Hart, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  32. Douglas H (2009) Science, policy, and the value-free ideal. University of Pittsburgh Press, PittsburgCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Duarte D (2006) A norma de legalidade procedimental administrativa – a teoria da norma e a criação de normas de decisão na discricionariedade administrativa. Almedina, CoimbraGoogle Scholar
  34. Duarte D (2009) Rebutting defeasibility as operative normative defeasibility. In: Dias AS et al (eds) Liber Amicorum de José de Sousa Brito. Coimbra Editora, CoimbraGoogle Scholar
  35. Duarte D (2010) Normative conditions of balancing: drawing up the boundaries of normative conflicts that lead to balances. In: Sieckmann J (ed) Legal reasoning: the methods of balancing. Steiner Verlag, StuttgartGoogle Scholar
  36. Duarte D (2011) Linguistic objectivity in norm sentences: alternatives in literal meaning. Ratio Juris 24(2):112–139CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Duarte D (2018) Norms on language and regulativeness of constitutive norms. In: Diritto & Questioni Pubbliche. XVIII, 1 (giugnio), pp 135–156Google Scholar
  38. Duarte D (2019) Legal science: the demarcation problem and the perimeter of “good science”. In: Duarte D, Lopes PM, Sampaio JS (eds) Legal interpretation and scientific knowledge. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  39. Dupré J (2007) Fact and value. In: Kincaid H, Dupré J, Wylie A (eds) Value-free science?: ideals and illusions. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  40. Dworkin R (1977) Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  41. Dworkin R (1978) No right answer. N Y Univ Law Rev 53(1):1–32Google Scholar
  42. Dworkin R (1985) A matter of principle. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  43. Dworkin R (1986) Law’s empire. Belknap Press, HarvardGoogle Scholar
  44. Endicott T (2001) Vagueness in law. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  45. Escher A (2019) When it is vague what is vague – identifying vagueness. In: Duarte D, Lopes PM, Sampaio JS (eds) Legal interpretation and scientific knowledge. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  46. Feteris ET (2017) Fundamentals of legal argumentation, 2nd edn. Springer, DordrechtCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Frändberg A (2018) The legal order. Springer, DordrechtCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Fuller L (1958) Positivism and fidelity to law – a reply to professor Hart. Harv Law Rev 71:630–672CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. García Amado JA (2004) La interpretación constitucional. Revista Jurídica de Castilla y León 2:35–72Google Scholar
  50. Gardner J (2001) Legal positivism: 5 ½ myths. Am J Jurisprud 46:199–227CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Gianformaggio L (1987) Lógica y argumentación en la interpretación jurídica o tomar a los juristas intérpretes en serio. Doxa 4:87–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Glanzberg M (2016) Truth. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/truth/ Google Scholar
  53. Green L (1999) Law and the causes of judicial decisions. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14/2009Google Scholar
  54. Guastini R (1999a) Los juristas a la búsqueda de ciencia. In: Guastini R (ed) Distinguiendo – Estudios de Teoría y Metateoría del Derecho. Gedisa, BarcelonaGoogle Scholar
  55. Guastini R (1999b) Reencuentro com la Interpretación. In: Guastini R (ed) Distinguiendo - Estudos de Teoría y Metateoría del Derecho. Gedisa, BarcelonaGoogle Scholar
  56. Guastini R (2011) Rule-scepticism restated. In: Green L, Leiter B (eds) Oxford studies in philosophy of law, vol I. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Guastini R (2012a) Juristenrecht. Inventando derechos, obligaciones y poderes. In: Beltrán JF, Moreso JJ, Papayannis DM (eds) Neutralidad y teoría del derecho. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  58. Guastini R (2012b) Para uma taxonomía de las controversias entre juristas. In: Luque Sánchez P, Ratti GB (eds) Acordes y desacuerdos – Cómo y por qué los juristas discrepan. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  59. Guastini R (2014) Interpretar y argumentar. CEPC, MadridGoogle Scholar
  60. Guastini R (2015) La Sintaxis del Derecho. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  61. Guastini R (2019) An analytical foundation of rule-scepticism. In: Duarte D, Lopes PM, Sampaio JS (eds) Legal interpretation and scientific knowledge. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  62. Hansson SO (2017) Science and Pseudo-science. In: Zalta EN (ed) Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/pseudo-science/ Google Scholar
  63. Hart HLA (1958) Positivism and the separation of law and morals. Harv Law Rev 71(4):593–629CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  64. Hart HLA (1977) American jurisprudence through English eyes: the nightmare and the Noble Dream. Georgia Law Rev 11(5):969–989Google Scholar
  65. Hart HLA (2012) The concept of law, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Himma KE (2003) Making sense of constitutional disagreement: legal positivism, the bill of rights, and the conventional rule of recognition in the United States. J Law Soc 4:149–218Google Scholar
  67. Iglesias Vila M (1998) Una crítica al positivismo hartiano: el problema del seguimiento de reglas. Analisi e Diritto. Giappichelli, Torino, pp 129–144Google Scholar
  68. Iglesias Vila M (1999) Facing judicial discretion. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  69. Iturralde Sesma V (1991) Sobre el silogismo jurídico. Anuario de Filosofia del Derecho VIIIGoogle Scholar
  70. Iturralde Sesma V (2014) Interpretación literal y significado convencional. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  71. Kahneman D (2011) Thinking fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  72. Kelsen H (2007) General theory of law and state. Lawbook Exchange, ClarkGoogle Scholar
  73. Kelsen H (2009) Pure theory of law, 2nd edn. The Lawbook Exchange, ClarkGoogle Scholar
  74. Kitcher P (2011) Science in a democratic society. Prometheus Books, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  75. Klatt M (2008) Making the law explicit – the normativity of legal argumentation. Hart, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  76. Korta K, Perry J (2015) The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. In: Zalta EN (ed) Pragmatics. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/pragmatics/ Google Scholar
  77. Kramer MH (2004) Objectivity and the rule of law. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  78. Kress K (1990) A preface to epistemological indeterminacy. Northwest Univ Law Rev 85(1):134Google Scholar
  79. Leiter B (1993) Objectivity and the problems of jurisprudence. Tex Law Rev 72:187–209Google Scholar
  80. Leiter B (1995) Legal Indeterminacy. Legal Theory 1:481–492CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  81. Leiter B (2001) Introduction. In: Leiter B (ed) Objectivity in law and morals. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  82. Leiter B (2004) Law and objectivity. In: Coleman J, Himma KE, Shapiro S (eds) The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  83. Leiter B (2005) American legal realism. In: Golding MP, Edmundson WA (eds) The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of law and legal theory. Blackwell, MaldenGoogle Scholar
  84. Lewis D (2001) Languages and language. In: Martinich AP (ed) Philosophy of language. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  85. Lewis D (2002) Convention: a philosophical study. Blackwell, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  86. Lifante Vidal I (2018) Argumentación e interpretación jurídica. Tirant lo Blanch, ValenciaGoogle Scholar
  87. Longino H (1990) Science as social knowledge: values and objectivity in scientific inquiry. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  88. Longino H (1996) Cognitive and non-cognitive values in science: rethinking the dichotomy. In: Nelson LH, Nelson J (eds) Feminism, science and the philosophy of science. Kluwer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  89. Lopes PM (2018) Legal science and «Juristenrecht»: the relevancy of language and discourse for the conceptual distinction. In Lopes PM (ed) Estudos de Teoria do Direito, vol I. AAFDL, LisboaGoogle Scholar
  90. Lopes PM, Franco R (2019) Naturalizing interpretation: a first approach on “hardware” and “software” determinants of legal interpretation. In: Duarte D, Lopes PM, Sampaio JS (eds) Legal interpretation and scientific knowledge. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  91. Luzzati C (1990) La vaghezza delle norme – Un'analisi del linguaggio giuridico. Giuffré, MilanoGoogle Scholar
  92. Lycan WG (2019) Philosophy of language, 3rd edn. Routledge, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  93. Lyons J (1977) Semantics, vol I. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  94. MacCormick N (1978) Legal reasoning and legal theory. Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  95. MacCormick N (1993) Argumentation and interpretation in law. Ratio Juris 6(1):16–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  96. Maranhão J (2017) Positivismo jurídico lógico-incluyente. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  97. Marín RH (2002) Introducción a la teoría dde la norma jurídica, 2nd edn. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  98. Marmor A (2001) Positive law and objective values. Clarendon Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  99. Marmor A (2005) Interpretation and legal theory, 2nd edn. Hart, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  100. Marmor A (2009) Social conventions: from language to law. Princeton University Press, PrincetonCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  101. Mazzarese T (1991) Norm proposition’. Epistemic and semantic queries. Rechtstheorie 22:39–70Google Scholar
  102. McGrath M, Frank D (2018) Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. In: Zalta EN (ed) Propositions. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/propositions/ Google Scholar
  103. Mendonca D (2000) Las Claves del Derecho. Gedisa, BarcelonaGoogle Scholar
  104. Mendonca D, Guibourg RA (2004) La odisea constitucional. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  105. Moore M (1985) A natural law theory of interpretation. South Calif Law Rev 58:277–398Google Scholar
  106. Moreso JJ (2002) Superevaluaciones y determinación normativa. In: Moreso JJ, Navarro PE, Redondo C (eds) Conocimiento jurídico y determinación normativa. Fontamara, MexicoGoogle Scholar
  107. Moreso JJ (2009) La Constitución: modelo para armar. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  108. Moreso JJ (2014) La indeterminación del Derecho y la inerpretación de la Constitución. 2ª ed. Palestra, LimaGoogle Scholar
  109. Moreso JJ, Chilovi S (2018) Interpretive arguments and the application of law. In: Bongiovanni G et al (eds) Handbook of legal reasoning and argumentation. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  110. Moreso JJ, Vilajosana JM (2004) Introducción a la Teoría del Derecho. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  111. Moreso JJ, Navarro PE, Redondo C (2002) Introducción. In: Moreso JJ, Navarro PE, Redondo C (eds) Conocimiento jurídico y determinación normativa. Fontamara, MéxicoGoogle Scholar
  112. Navarro PE (2002) Enunciados jurídicos y proposiciones normativas. In: Moreso JJ, Navarro PE, Redondo C (eds) Conocimiento jurídico y determinación normativa. Fontamara, MéxicoGoogle Scholar
  113. Navarro PE, Orunescu C, Rodríguez JL, Sucar G (2004) Applicability of legal norms. Can J Law Jurisprud XVII (2):337–359CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  114. Nerhot P (1990) Interpretation in legal science. In: Nerhot P (ed) Law, interpretation and reality. Springer, DordrehtCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  115. Nino CS (1999) Algunos modelos de metodológicos de ‘ciencia’ jurídica. Fontanamara, MexicoGoogle Scholar
  116. Nino CS (2018) Introducción al análisis del derecho, 5ª ed. Ariel, BarcelonaGoogle Scholar
  117. Orunesu C (2012) Positivismo jurídico y sistemas constitucionales. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  118. Pavlakos G, Coyle S (2005) Introduction. In: Coyle S, Pavlakos G (eds) Jurisprudence or legal science? Hart, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  119. Peczenik A (2008) On law and reason. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  120. Pino G (2013) Di interpretazione e di interpreti della Costituzione. Note a margine a Interpretazione e costituzione di Aljs Vignudelli. Diritto e società 2:353–373Google Scholar
  121. Pino G (2016) Teoria analitica del diritto I – La norma giuridica. ETS. In: PisaGoogle Scholar
  122. Pino G (2019) The politics of legal interpretation. In: Duarte D, Lopes PM, Sampaio JS (eds) Legal interpretation and scientific knowledge. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  123. Poggi F (2013) The myth of literal meaning in legal interpretation. In: Analisi e Diritto. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  124. Pozzolo S (2001) Neocostituzionalismo e positivismo giuridico. Giapichelli, TorinoGoogle Scholar
  125. Priel D (2012) El Modelo Científico de la Teoría del Derecho. In: Beltrán JF, Moreso JJ, Papayannis DM (eds) Neutralidad y teoría del derecho. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar
  126. Pulido CB (2003) Estructura y limites de la ponderación. Doxa (26):225–238Google Scholar
  127. Putnam H (2002) The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  128. Raz J (1980) The concept of a legal system, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  129. Raz J (1985) Authority, law and morality. Monist 68(3):295–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  130. Raz J (1996) Why interpret? Ratio Juris 9:349–363CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  131. Raz J (1999) Practical reasons and norms. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  132. Raz J (2009) Between authority and interpretation. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  133. Recanati F (2003) Literal meaning. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  134. Redondo C (2002) Teorías del Derecho e Indeterminación Normativa. In: Moreso JJ, Navarro PE, Redondo C (eds) Conocimiento jurídico y determinación normativa. Fontamara, MéxicoGoogle Scholar
  135. Reichenback H (1951) The rise of scientific philosophy. University of California Press, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
  136. Reiss J, Sprenger J (2017) Scientific objectivity. In: Zalta EN (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/scientific-objectivity/ Google Scholar
  137. Rodríguez JL, Orunesu C (2016) Razonamiento y Decisión Judicial – La Justificación de las Decisiones Judiciales en las Democracias ConstitucionalesGoogle Scholar
  138. Rorty R (1989) Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  139. Ross A (1958) On law and justice. Stevens, LondonGoogle Scholar
  140. Rudner R (1953) The scientist Qua scientist makes value judgments. Philos Sci 20:1–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  141. Sampaio JS (2018) Proportionality in its narrow sense and measuring the intensity of restrictions on fundamental rights. In: Duarte D, Sampaio JS (eds) Proportionality in law. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  142. Sampaio JS (2019) Human dignity’s contestedness, analytical reconstruction of the prohibition of instrumentalization and a reassessment of the aviation security act case. In: Brito MN et al (eds) The role of legal argumentation and human dignity in constitutional courts. Steiner Verlag/Nomos, StuttgartGoogle Scholar
  143. Sandro P (2014) Creation and application of law: a neglected distinction. Ph.D. Thesis. University of Edinburgh, EdinburghGoogle Scholar
  144. Sartor G (2012) Defeasibility in legal reasoning. In: Ferrer Beltrán J, Ratti GB (eds) The logic of legal requirements – essays on defeasibility. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  145. Schauer F (1991) Playing by the rules. Clarendon Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  146. Schauer F (1995) Giving reasons. Stanford Law Rev 47(4):633–659CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  147. Schauer F (2009) Thinking like a lawyer. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  148. Schiavello A (2013) The third theory of legal objectivity. In: Araszkiewicz M, Šavelka J (eds) Coherence: insights from philosophy, jurisprudence and artificial intelligence. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  149. Searle JR (1970) Speech acts: an essay in the philosophy of language. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  150. Siltala R (2011) Law, truth and reason – a treatise on legal argumentation. Springer, DordrechtCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  151. Soames S (2008) Philosophical essays, vol I. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  152. Soames S (2014) Toward a theory of legal interpretation. In: Soames S (ed) Analytical philosophy in America and other historical and contemporary essays. Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar
  153. Solum BL (2010) Indeterminacy. In: Patterson D (ed) A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory, 2nd edn. Wiley-Blackwell, MaldenGoogle Scholar
  154. Tarello G (2013) La interpretación de la Ley. Palestra, LimaGoogle Scholar
  155. Unger RM (1983) The critical legal studies movement. Harvard University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  156. Vaquero AN (2013) Five models of legal science. Revus (19):53–81Google Scholar
  157. Villa V (2010) A pragmatically oriented theory of legal interpretation. Revus (12):89–120Google Scholar
  158. Villa V (2012) Theory of legal interpretation and contextualism – replies to Kristan, Poggi and Vignolo. Revus 17:151–178Google Scholar
  159. Villa V (2016) Deep interpretive disagreements and theory of legal interpretation. In: Capone A, Poggi F (eds) Pragmatics and law – philosophical perspectives. Springer, DordrechtGoogle Scholar
  160. von Kirchmann JH (2015) La Jurisprudência no es Ciencia. Pacifico EditoresGoogle Scholar
  161. von Wright GH (1971) Explanation and understanding. Routledge & Kegan Paul, LondonGoogle Scholar
  162. von Wright GH (1983) The foundations of norms and normative statements. In: von Wright GH (eds) Practical reason. Philosophical papers, vol I. Basil Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  163. Waldron J (1999) Law and disagreement. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  164. Wróblewski J (1969) Legal reasoning in legal interpretation. Logique & Analyse 12(45):3–31Google Scholar
  165. Wróblewski J (1971) Legal decision and its justification. Logique & Analyse 14(53–54):409–419Google Scholar
  166. Wróblewski J (1974) Legal syllogism and rationality of judicial decision. Rechtstheorie 14(5):133–146Google Scholar
  167. Wróblewski J (1985) Meaning and Truth in Judicial Decision. Helsinki, JuridicaGoogle Scholar
  168. Wróblewski J (1989) Contemporary models of the legal science. Polish Academy of Science, LódzGoogle Scholar
  169. Wróblewski J (1992) The judicial application of law. Kluwer, DordrechtCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  170. Zorrilla DM (2010) Metodología jurídica. Marcial Pons, MadridGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Lisbon School of LawLisbonPortugal

Personalised recommendations