Advertisement

Corrupt Practices in Public Procurement: Evidence from Poland

  • Arkadiusz BorowiecEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics book series (EBES, volume 11/1)

Abstract

Contracts and management of public investment contracts are particularly vulnerable to fraud and corruption. This is due in large part to the large scale of these investments, which are followed by huge amounts of money and sometimes the difficulties associated with effective oversight of a large number of contracts. Disclosure of illegal payments often hinders public investment, leads to their failure or improper implementation. As a result, there are big losses incurred by the state budget. This paper examines 75 companies involved in the procurement process to identify the most common corrupt practices used by awarding entities at various stages of the proceedings. The paper also attempts to formulate recommendations concerning the economic policy of the state in the examined area.

Keywords

Public procurement Policy making Corruption 

References

  1. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., & Johnson, S. (2001, December). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91, 1369–1401.Google Scholar
  2. Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, competition, and corruption. American Economic Review, 89(4), 982–993.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Council of Europe. (1999). Civil law convention on corruption (European Treaty Series No. 174). Strasburg.Google Scholar
  4. Demsetz, H. (1967). Towards a theory of property rights. American Economic Review, 57(2), 347–359.Google Scholar
  5. Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002). The regulation of entry. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), 1–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Dobrowolski, Z. (2001). Corruption in public life. Zielona Góra: Organon.Google Scholar
  7. European Commission. (2017). European semester – Summary of information theme. Public orders [pdf]. European Commission. Retrieved from November 20, 2017, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/european-semester_thematic-factsheet_public-procurement_pl.pdf
  8. Glaeser, E., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? Journal of Economic Growth, 9(3), 271–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Hay, J., & Shleifer, A. (1998). Private enforcement of public laws: A theory of legal reform. American Economic Review, 88(2), 398–403.Google Scholar
  10. Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Kaufman, D., & Wei, S.-J. (1998). Does “grease money” speed up the wheels of commerce? The World Bank. Washington, DC. Retrieved November 20, 2017, from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/grease.pdf
  12. Klitgaard, R. (1988). Controlling corruption. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
  13. Leff, N. H. (1964). Economic development through bureaucratic corruption. American Behavioral Scientist, 82(2), 8–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Lindbeck, A. (1975). Swedish economic policy. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  15. Lipset, S. M. (1960). Political man: The social basis of modern politics. New York: Doubleday.Google Scholar
  16. Makowski, G. (2008). Corruption as a social problem. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo “Trio”.Google Scholar
  17. Mauro, P. (2005). Corruption and growth. In A. Mishra (Ed.), The economics of corruption. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  18. Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1991). The allocation of talent: Implications for growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106, 503–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth? American Economic Review, 83(2), 409–414.Google Scholar
  20. Myrdal, G. (2005). Corruption: Its causes and effects. In A. Mishra (Ed.), The economics of corruption. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  21. Olken, B. (2003). Corruption and the costs of redistribution: Micro evidence from Indonesia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  22. Olken, B. (2004). Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Olszewska, M. (2007). Public procurement monitor. Wydawnictwo Forum Sp. z o.o., No. 12.Google Scholar
  24. Rauch, J., & Evans, P. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. Journal of Public Economics, 75(1), 49–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Reinikka, R., & Svensson, J. (2004). Local capture: Evidence from a central government transfer program in Uganda. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 1–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Van Rijckeghem, C., & Weder, B. (2001). Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: Do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much? Journal of Development Economics, 65(2), 307–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Yang, D. (2005). Integrity for hire: An analysis of a widespread program for combating customs corruption. In R. Gerald (Ed.), Ford school of public policy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Engineering ManagementPoznan University of TechnologyPoznanPoland

Personalised recommendations