Introduction: Examined Live – An Epistemological Exchange Between Philosophy and Cultural Psychology on Reflection

  • Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho
  • Luca TateoEmail author
  • Felipe R. L. Santos
Part of the Philosophical Studies Series book series (PSSP, volume 141)


Since the famous passage in which Socrates (Plato 1997) says that the unexamined, and therefore non-reflected, life is not worth living, “reflection” has been a diffuse and iterant term in ethics, moral philosophy, epistemology, political philosophy (Tiberius 2008; Skorupski 2010), but also in psychology (Marsico et al. 2015). This volume opens a new perspective on the topic of reflection, considering the most recent approaches in both philosophy (namely in epistemology) and cultural psychology.


Reflection Virtue epistemology Cultural psychology Agency Understanding 



The editors are grateful to the institutions that provided intellectual and material support to the making of this volume. Waldomiro Silva Filho thanks the CNPq (Brazil) for the research grant “Bolsa de Produtividade em Pesquisa (#312111/2016-9)”, the CAPES (Brazil) for the international senior visiting grant (BEX 2706/15-6) at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, Cambridge, MA), as visiting researcher between 2015 and 2016. He is also grateful to CONCEPT (Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition) of Universität zu Köln (Cologne, Germany) that had him as visiting professor between 2017 and 2018. The idea of this book originated during the visiting at MIT, under the supervision of Prof. Agustin Rayo and the courses of Prof. Alex Byrne. The period at CONCEPT was useful for the final organization of the book and, for these reasons, a special thanks is due to Prof. Sven Bernecker and to Felipe Rocha, his principal interlocutor. Finally, Silva Filho is grateful to the Department of Philosophy at Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA) for creating the institutional conditions allowing his periods of leave in order to accomplish research staying abroad.

Luca Tateo is grateful to the Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA) for hosting his research stays as an international visiting professor, during which he has had the opportunity to establish a very fruitful dialogue between Europe and Brazil and between cultural psychology and a number of other disciplines.

Felipe Rocha L. Santos contributed to this introduction and he is grateful to the Department of Philosophy at Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBA), for hosting him in the postdoctoral fellowship program PNPD (Programa Nacional de Pós-Doutorado), and also to CONCEPT (Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition) of Universität zu Köln (Cologne, Germany), where he has been visiting scholar between June and August 2017.


  1. Baehr, J. 2008. Four varities of character-based virtue epistemology. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 46: 469–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Bahr, A., and M. Seidel, eds. 2016. Ernest Sosa: Targeting his philosophy. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  3. Battaly, H. 2008. Virtue epistemology. Philosophy Compass 3: 639–663.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bett, R., ed. 2010. The Cambridge companion to acient scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Bonjour, Laurence. 1985. The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Brentano, F. 1874/2012. Psychology from an empirical standpoint. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  7. Bühler, K. 1907/1999. Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgänge. I. Über Gedanken. Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie 9: 297–365. [Nachdruck in: Ziche, P. (Ed.). (1999). Introspektion. Texte zur Selbstwahrnehmung des Ichs (pp. 157–209). Berlin: Springer].Google Scholar
  8. Burkart, T. 2018. Dialogic introspection: A method of investigating experience. Human Arenas 1 (2): 167–190. Scholar
  9. Chisholm, R.M. 1973. The problem of criterion. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.Google Scholar
  10. ———. 1989. Theory of knowledge. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
  11. Christensen, D., and J. Lackey. 2013. The epistemology of disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Doris, J.M. 2015. Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Dunning, D. 2005. Self-insight: Roadblocks and detours on the path to knowing thyself. New York: Psychology Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Engel, P. 2013. Is epistemic agency possible? Philosophical Issue, Epistemic Agency 23: 158–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Feldman, R., and T. Warfield. 2010. Disagreement. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Frances, B. 2014. Disagreement. Cambridge: Polity.Google Scholar
  17. Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the will and the concept of a person. In The importance of what we care about – Philosophical papers, 11–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1988.Google Scholar
  18. ———. 1999. The faintest passion. In Necessity, volition, and love. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  19. Goldman, A. 1979. What is justified belief? In Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences, 105–126. Cambridge, MA: Bradford., 1992.Google Scholar
  20. Greco, J., ed. 2004. Ernest Sosa and his critics. Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  21. ———. 2013. Reflective knowledge and the pyrrhonian problematic. In Virtuous thoughts: The philosophy of Ernest Sosa, ed. J. Turri, 179–191. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Gürtner, A., F. Tschan, N.K. Semmer, and C. Nägele. 2007. Getting groups to develop good strategies: Effects of reflexivity interventions on team process, team performance, and shared mental models. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 102: 127–142. Scholar
  23. Hermans, H.J. 2002. The dialogical self as a society of mind: Introduction. Theory & Psychology 12 (2): 147–160.Google Scholar
  24. Hieronymi, P. 2014. Reflection and responsibility. Philosophy & Public Affairs 42 (1): 3–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Kahneman, D. 2011. Thinking, fast and slow, 2013. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar
  26. Kornblith, H., ed. 2001. Epistemology: Internalism and externalism. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  27. ———. 2002. Knowledge and its place in nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. ———. 2012. On reflection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Korsgaard, C. 1996. The sources of normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. ———. 2008. Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Kvanvig, J.L. 2003. The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Livengood, J., J. Sytsma, A. Feltz, R. Scheines, and E. Machery. 2010. Philosophical temperament. Philosophical Psychology 23: 313–330. Scholar
  33. Mann, K., J. Gordon, and A. MacLeod. 2009. Reflection and reflective practice in health professions education: A systematic review. Advances in Health Science Education 14: 595–621.–007–9090–2.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Marková, I. 2016. The dialogical mind: Common sense and ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Marsico, G., R. Andrisano Ruggieri, and S. Salvatore, eds. 2015. Reflexivity and psychology. Charlotte, NC: Information Age.Google Scholar
  36. Matheson, J. 2015. The epistemic significance of disagreement. London: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Mayr, E. 2011. Understanding human agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  39. Nagel, Thomas. 1996. Universality and the reflective self. In The sources of normativity, ed. Christine Korsgaard, 200–209. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Pfadenhauer, M., and H. Knoblauch, eds. 2019. Social constructivism as paradigm? London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  41. Plato. 1997. Complete works. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.Google Scholar
  42. Procee, H. 2006. Reflection in education: A Kantian epistemology. Educational Theory 56: 237–253.–5446.2006.00225.x.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Proust, J. 2013. The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self-awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Ransome, W. 2009. Moral reflection. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Sextus Empiricus (HP). 2000. Outlines of Scepticism (Hipotiposes Pirronianas – Pyrrōneioi Hypotypōeis). Trans. & ed. Julia Anna and Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  46. Silva Filho, W.J., and F.S. Rocha. 2015. Reflection, epistemic value and human flourishing. Analytica 19 (1): 129–144.Google Scholar
  47. Skorupski, J. 2010. The domain fo reasons I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Sosa, E. 1985. Knowledge and intellectual virtue. In Knowledge in perspective: selected essays in epistemology, 225–244. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1991.Google Scholar
  49. ———. 1991. Knowledge in perspective: Selected essays in epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. ———. 2007. A virtue epistemology. Vol. I. Oxford: Oxford UP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. ———. 2009. Reflective knowledge. Vol. II. Oxford: Oxford UP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. ———. 2011. Knowing full well. Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  53. ———. 2013. Pyrrhonian skepticism and human agency. Philosophical Issue 23: 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. ———. 2015. Judgement and agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. ———. 2017. Epistemology. Princeton/London: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Tateo, L. 2015. Gulliver’s eggs: Why methods are not an issue of qualitative research in cultural psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science 49 (2): 187–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  57. Tiberius, V. 2008. The reflective life: Living wisely with our limits. Oxford: Oxford UP.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  58. Trapnell, P.D., and D.T. Campbell. 1999. Private self-consciousness and the five-factor model of personality: Distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76: 284–304.–3514.76.2.284.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Turri, J., ed. 2013. Virtuous thoughts: The philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Dordrecht: Springer.Google Scholar
  60. Vähämaa, M. 2018. Common sense, language, and semantic primes: Liminal or constant concepts of psychology? Human Arenas 1 (3): 305–320. Scholar
  61. Valsiner, J. 2015. The purpose of purpose. In Jerome S. Bruner beyond 100: Cultivating possibilities, ed. G. Marsico, 79–86. New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  62. ———. 2017. From methodology to methods in human psychology. New York: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Valsiner, J., Marsico, G., Chaudhary, N., Sato, T., & Dazzani, V. (Eds.) (2016). Psychology as the science of human being. The Yokohama manifesto. Cham: Springer International Publishing.Google Scholar
  64. Van Seggelen–Damen, I.C.M., R. Van Hezewijk, A.S. Helsdingen, and J.I.G. Wopereis. 2017. Reflection: A socratic approach. Theory and Psychology 27 (6): 793–814. Scholar
  65. Van Woerkom, M., and M. Croon. 2008. Operationalizing critically reflective work behavior. Personnel Review 37: 317–331. Scholar
  66. Zagzebski, L.T. 1996. Virtue of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Waldomiro J. Silva-Filho
    • 1
  • Luca Tateo
    • 1
    Email author
  • Felipe R. L. Santos
    • 2
  1. 1.Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências HumanasFederal University of BahiaBahiaBrazil
  2. 2.Federal University of BahiaBahiaBrazil

Personalised recommendations