Advertisement

Technological Change and Market Design

  • Marek PyciaEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

Technological innovations lead to new market designs and new designs catalyze the emergence of new technologies. Building on examples drawn from recent advances in medical, electricity, car, computing, and data collection technologies, this note discusses the relationship between technological change and market design with an emphasis on new questions for market design theory.

References

  1. Abdulkadiroglu, A., Che, Y.-K., & Yasuda, Y. (2011). Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: The Boston mechanism reconsidered. American Economic Review, 101, 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Abdulkadiroglu, A., Agarwal, N., & Pathak, P. (2017). The welfare effects of coordinated assignment: Evidence from the New York City high school match. American Economic Review, 107, 3635–3689.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Anderson, E. J., Holmberg, P., & Philpott, A. B. (2013). Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good auctions. RAND Journal of Economics, 44, 1–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Arnott, R., de Palma, A., & Lindsey, R. (1993). A structural model of peak-period congestion: A traffic bottleneck with elastic demand. The American Economic Review, 83, 161–179.Google Scholar
  5. Ashlagi, I., & Shi, P. (2015). Improving community cohesion in school choice via correlated-lottery implementation. Operations Research, 62, 1247–1264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Ausubel, L. M., Cramton, P., Pycia, M., Rostek, M., & Weretka, M. (2014). Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, 81, 1366–1400.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Bergstrom, T. C., Garratt, R. J., & Sheehan-Connor, D. (2009). One chance in a million: Altruism and the bone marrow registry. American Economic Review, 99, 1309–1334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2009). Beyond revealed preference: Choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 51–104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Bogomolnaia, A., & Moulin, H. (2001). A new solution to the random assignment problem. Journal of Economic Theory, 100, 295–328.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Butt, F. K., Gritsch, H. A., Schulam, P., Danovitch, G. M., Wilkinson, A., Pizzo, J. D., et al. (2009). Asynchronous, out-of-sequence, transcontinental chain kidney transplantation: A novel concept. American Journal of Transplantation, 9, 2180–2185.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Calzolari, G., & Pavan, A. (2006). On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting. Journal of Economic theory, 130, 168–204.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Cremer, J., & McLean, R. P. (1988). Full extraction of the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auctions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1247–1257.Google Scholar
  13. Davis, S. (2014). Presentation - Kn-Grid - Lead commissioner workshop on electric and natural gas vehicles in California. Technical report TN 73170, California Energy Commission.Google Scholar
  14. Davis, S. (2016). Presentation - Kn-Grid - California energy commission vehicle-grid integration workshop SB 350 transportation electrification (Publicly Owned Utilities). Technical report 16-TRAN-01, California Energy Commission.Google Scholar
  15. Epstein, L. G., & Peters, M. (1999). A revelation principle for competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 88, 119–160.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Ergin, H., Sonmez, T., & Unver, M. U. (2017). Dual-donor organ exchange. ECMA forthcoming.Google Scholar
  17. Featherstone, C. R., & Niederle, M. (2016). Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation. Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 353–375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Fehr, E., & Rangel, A. (2011). Neuroeconomic foundations of economic choice - recent advances. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 3–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. He, Y., Miralles, A., Pycia, M., & Yan, J. (2018). A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10, 272–314.Google Scholar
  20. Krajbich, I., Camerer, C., & Rangel, A. (2017). Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior, 101, 49–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Martimort, D., & Stole, L. (2002). The revelation and delegation principles in common agency games. Econometrica, 70, 1659–1673.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Miralles, A. (2008). School choice: The case for the Boston mechanism, Boston University. Working paper.Google Scholar
  23. Pavan, A., & Calzolari, G. (2009). Sequential contracting with multiple principals. Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 503–531.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Peck, J. (1997). A note on competing mechanisms and the revelation principle.Google Scholar
  25. Peters, M. (2001). Common agency and the revelation principle. Econometrica, 69, 1349–1372.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Peters, M., & Severinov, S. (1997). Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices. Journal of Economic Theory, 75, 141–179.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Peters, M., & Szentes, B. (2012). Definable and contractible contracts. Econometrica, 80, 363–411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Pycia, M. (2011). The cost of ordinality, Working paper.Google Scholar
  29. Pycia, M., & Woodward, K. (2016). Pay-as-bid: Selling divisible goods.Google Scholar
  30. Rangel, A., & Hare, T. (2010). Neural computations associated with goal-directed choice. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 20, 262–270. Cognitive neuroscience.Google Scholar
  31. Rees, M. A., Kopke, J. E., Pelletier, R. P., Segev, D. L., Rutter, M. E., Fabrega, A. J., et al. (2009). A non-simultaneous extended altruistic donor chain. The New England Journal of Medicine, 360, 1096–1101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., & Unver, M. U. (2004). Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119, 457–488.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., & Unver, M. U. (2005). Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of Economic Theory, 125, 151–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., Unver, U., Delmonico, F. L., & Saidman, S. L. (2006). Utilizing list exchange and non-directed donation through chain paired kidney donations. American Journal of Transplantation, 6, 2694–2705.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Roth, A. E., Sonmez, T., & Unver, M. U. (2007). Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence of wants in markets with compatibility-based preferences. American Economic Review, 97, 828–851.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Ruff, C. C., & Fehr, E. (2014). The neurobiology of rewards and values in social decision making. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15, 549–562.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  37. Salant, Y., & Rubinstein, A. (2008). (A, f): Choice with frames. The Review of Economic Studies, 75, 1287–1296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  38. Sönmez, T., Ünver, M. U., & Yenmez, M. B. (2018). Incentivized kidney exchange. Working paper.Google Scholar
  39. Taylor, C. (2004). Consumer privacy and the market for customer information. RAND Journal of Economics, 35, 631–650.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Troyan, P. (2012). Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare. Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 936–947.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  41. Veale, J. L., Capron, A. M., Nassiri, N., Danovitch, G., Gritsch, H. A., AmyWaterman, J. D., et al. (2017). Vouchers for future kidney transplants to overcome “Chronological Incompatibility” between living donors and recipients. Transplantation, 101, 2115–2119.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Vickrey, W. S. (1969). Congestion theory and transport investment. The American Economic Review, 59.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of ZürichZürichSwitzerland

Personalised recommendations