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Design for Weakly Structured Environments

Chapter for The Future of Economic Design
  • Gabriel CarrollEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

This essay argues that, in order for economic design to speak to a broader range of applications, it should move toward models with less parametric structure. This will in turn require a cultural shift away from the current emphasis on being able to solve exactly for optimal mechanisms. I offer some ideas about what other kinds of valuable theoretical contributions would look like, drawing on existing recent work for examples.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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