Beyond the Stand-Alone Core Conditions

  • Jens Leth HougaardEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


The stand alone core conditions have played a key role in the fair allocation literature for decades and has been successfully applied in many types of models where agents share a common cost or revenue. Yet, the stand-alone core conditions are not indispensable when looking for fair ways to share. The present note provides a few examples of network models where the relevance of the stand-alone core is questionable and fairness seems to require a different approach. In a networked future, design of allocation mechanisms is therefore likely to move beyond the stand alone core.



Constructive comments from Justin Leroux and Christian Trudeau are gratefully acknowledged.


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.IFRO, University of CopenhagenFrederiksberg CDenmark

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