Beyond the Stand-Alone Core Conditions
The stand alone core conditions have played a key role in the fair allocation literature for decades and has been successfully applied in many types of models where agents share a common cost or revenue. Yet, the stand-alone core conditions are not indispensable when looking for fair ways to share. The present note provides a few examples of network models where the relevance of the stand-alone core is questionable and fairness seems to require a different approach. In a networked future, design of allocation mechanisms is therefore likely to move beyond the stand alone core.
Constructive comments from Justin Leroux and Christian Trudeau are gratefully acknowledged.
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