Realizing Epistemic Democracy

  • Marcus PivatoEmail author
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)


Many collective decisions depend upon questions about objective facts or probabilities. Several theories in social choice and political philosophy suggest that democratic institutions can obtain accurate answers to such questions. But these theories are founded on assumptions and modelling paradigms that are both implausible and incompatible with one another. I will propose a roadmap for a more realistic and unified approach to this problem.



I thank Gabriel Carroll, Franz Dietrich, Umberto Grandi, Justin Leroux, Christian List, Arianna Novaro, Kai Spiekermann, and Bill Zwicker for their very helpful comments. None of them are responsible for any errors.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Université de Cergy-PontoiseCergyFrance

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