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On the Future of Economic Design—The Personal Ruminations of a Matching Theorist

  • Szilvia PapaiEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Studies in Economic Design book series (DESI)

Abstract

This note is a brief personal rumination on the state of economic design, advocating the importance of theory and listing broadly desirable features of future theoretical research agendas.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsConcordia UniversityMontrealCanada

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