On Value of Knowledge and Understanding
This chapter begins by introducing some Qur’ānic distinctions relevant to the value problem. It is noted that value of knowledge for the Qur’ān is rooted in its practical value. Relevance of the Qur’ānic view of taqwā as reflective and motivational epistemic conscience for a solution to the value problem is noted. The bulk of the chapter deals with discussions of the value problem between contemporary virtue epistemologists. It is argued that Zagzebsky correctly criticizes the machine-product model of knowledge assumed by process reliabilism. Brogaard’s criticism of Zagzebsky’s position regarding its Moorean conception of value is evaluated and it is argued that the Zagzebsky motive-action model for knowledge effectively addresses the value problem rather than a simple shift to a different (Korsgaardian) model of value as suggested by Brogaard. Pritchard’s criticism of Zagzebsky and other robust virtue epistemologists is evaluated. It is argued that knowledge, while valuable as shown by Zagzebsky’s model, is correctly claimed by Pritchard to be not finally valuable. Kvanvig’s and Pritchard’s positions are combined to underscore why understanding is finally valuable.
KeywordsValue problem Machine-product model Motive-action model Final value
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