From Ignorance to Knowledge: Deriving Epistemic Virtues from the Qur’ānic Conception of Ignorance

  • M. Ashraf Adeel
Part of the Sophia Studies in Cross-cultural Philosophy of Traditions and Cultures book series (SCPT, volume 29)


This chapter aims at an analysis of the Qur’ānic concept of ignorance in the light contemporary virtue epistemology with its focus on intellectual virtues. In Sect. 2.1 below I give a brief set of introductory remarks about the contemporary emergence of virtue epistemology and the directions in which it is evolving. Sosa’s seminal work for bridging the divide between foundationalism and coherentism through the concept of intellectual virtue is noted along with early work done by Montmarquet and Code on intellectual responsibility and conscientiousness. Sosa’s reliabilist and Zagzebsky’s responsibilist positions are highlighted. This overview sets the stage for casting a careful look in Sect. 2.2 at all the verses of the Qur’ān that talk about remediable blameworthy ignorance in humans with the purpose of deriving from them what the Qur’ān takes to be central epistemic virtues. The analysis brings out various intellectual virtues that mostly seem to be forms of epistemic conscientiousness.


Igorance Virtue epistemology Intellectual responsibility Epistemic conscientiousness Reliabilist Responsibilist 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Ashraf Adeel
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyKutztown University of PennsylvaniaKutztownUSA

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