Robust/Recover Provable Data Possession Protocol

  • Chao FengEmail author
  • Honghong Wang
  • Wenbo Wan
  • Qinghua Li
  • Fangzhou Xu
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 895)


Provable data possession (PDP) allows a client that has stored data at remote server to verify that the server correctly possesses the original data. A long-standing problem is how to reduce I/O cost. Through the integration of Online-code and PDP, a challenge/check protocol that can verifies the possession is proposed. The protocol generates probabilistic proofs of possession by sampling tiny sets of data, which obviously reduces I/O cost. Meanwhile, the protocol can recover corrupted data. The authors formalize this notion in the Robust/Recover (RR) provable data possession guarantee. Briefly speaking, the client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/check protocol transmits a constant amount of data, which reduces communication complexity. The authors give a detailed analysis of this protocol and build a simulation to evaluate practicability in reliability, space overhead, computation complexity, and communication complexity.


Data outsourcing Provable data possession Online-code Robust/Recover 



The authors would like to thank G. Ateniese, K. Bowers, Guomin Yang and Haiying Liu for sharing their deep insights about delegated computation and KEA1-assumption related matters. This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61701270) and Cooperation Foundation for The Youth Doctors of QiLu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences) (Grant No. 2017BSHZ008).


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chao Feng
    • 1
    • 4
    Email author
  • Honghong Wang
    • 2
  • Wenbo Wan
    • 3
  • Qinghua Li
    • 1
  • Fangzhou Xu
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Physics, School of Electronic and Information EngineeringQilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences)JinanPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.School of Electrical Engineering and AutomationQilu University of Technology (Shandong Academy of Sciences)JinanPeople’s Republic of China
  3. 3.School of Information Science and EngineeringShandong Normal UniversityJinanPeople’s Republic of China
  4. 4.Institute of Automation, Shandong Academy of SciencesJinanPeople’s Republic of China

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