Dynamic Network Configuration: An Effective Defensive Protocol for Public Blockchain

  • Zhengwei JiangEmail author
  • Chenyang LvEmail author
  • Bo ZhangEmail author
  • Chao ZhangEmail author
  • Wei LuEmail author
  • Shouling JiEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 895)


To earning unfair profits, adversaries can attack the legitimate nodes in the Bitcoin network with selfish mining, the eclipse attack and the information delaying attack. In this paper, we study the patterns of the above attacks and then present a scheme to enhance the security of the Bitcoin network. First, we propose a new structure for the Bitcoin network called double-layer dynamic network, which improves the defense capability of Bitcoin against several attacks. Second, we design a new structure for the blocks in the Bitcoin network, which provides a way to store the IP addresses in the blocks. Third, we present a novel network protocol named dynamic network configuration for public blockchain. Our protocol pushes the updating of IP addresses in the blocks and changes the construction of the network periodically. From theoretical analysis and simulated evaluation, we find that under our protocol, the Bitcoin network can defend against the selfish mining, the eclipse attack and the information delaying attack effectively.


Bitcoin Defensive protocol P2P network 



This work was partly supported by NSFC under No. 61772466, the Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation for Distinguished Young Scholars under No. R19F020013, the Provincial Key Research and Development Program of Zhejiang, China under No. 2017C01055, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, and the Alibaba-ZJU Joint Research Institute of Frontier Technologies. Technology Project of State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power co. LTD under NO. 5211HZ17000J.


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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power CO., LTD.HangzhouChina
  2. 2.College of Computer Science and TechnologyZhejiang UniversityHangzhouChina
  3. 3.NARI Group CorporationBeijingChina
  4. 4.State Grid Hangzhou Power Supply CompanyHangzhouChina

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