On the Security of MIL-STD-1553 Communication Bus

  • Orly StanEmail author
  • Adi Cohen
  • Yuval EloviciEmail author
  • Asaf ShabtaiEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11552)


MIL-STD-1553 is a military standard that defines the physical and logical layers, and a command/response time division multiplexing of a communication bus used in military and aerospace avionic platforms for more than 40 years. As a legacy platform, MIL-STD-1553 was designed for high level of fault tolerance while less attention was taken with regard to security. Recent studies already addressed the impact of successful cyber-attacks on aerospace vehicles that are implementing MIL-STD-1553. In this work we present a security analysis of MIL-STD-1553, which enumerates the assets and threats to the communication bus, as well as defines the attacker’s profile.


MIL-STD-1553 Anomaly detection Communication bus security 


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© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Software and Information Systems EngineeringBen-Gurion University of the NegevBeershebaIsrael

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