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Managing Your Kleptographic Subscription Plan

  • George TeşeleanuEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 11445)

Abstract

In the classical kleptographic business models, the manufacturer of a device D is paid either in advance or in installments by a malicious entity to backdoor D. Unfortunately, these models have an inherent high risk for the manufacturer. This translates in high costs for clients. To address this issue, we introduce a subscription based business model and tackle some of the technical difficulties that arise.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science“Al.I.Cuza” University of IaşiIaşiRomania
  2. 2.Advanced Technologies InstituteBucharestRomania

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