Non-Genuine Actors

  • Susannah B. F. Paletz
  • Brooke E. Auxier
  • Ewa M. Golonka
Part of the SpringerBriefs in Complexity book series (BRIEFSCOMPLEXITY)


Non-genuine actors, including social bots and sockpuppets, are automated or manipulated to post information and sentiment to various social media platforms. Though not all social bots and sockpuppets are nefarious, there is evidence that some of these non-genuine accounts—especially on Facebook and Twitter—are maliciously managed by hackers or state actors, to spread misinformation and spam. Trolls may or may not be automated, but are consciously or unconsciously divisive.


Social media Social media users Social media sharing Trolls Bots Sockpuppets State actors Political science Sociology Information science Sociopolitical Narratives 


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Copyright information

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Susannah B. F. Paletz
    • 1
  • Brooke E. Auxier
    • 2
  • Ewa M. Golonka
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Advanced Study of LanguageUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA
  2. 2.Philip Merrill College of JournalismUniversity of MarylandCollege ParkUSA

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