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Towards Pragmatic Realism

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 128)

Abstract

The chapter adds a further, and, to the present purpose, final, link, in favour of a construction conception of legal meaning and interpretive realism. It presents a five-steps argument. The first step lays down a conceptual framework. The second step provides a revisited account of three theories of legal interpretation—realism (non-cognitivism) and two varieties of formalism (integral and limited cognitivism)—putting forth a few criticisms of the latter. The third step concerns pragmatic formalism, the sophisticated version of limited cognitivism Andrei Marmor defends by resorting to the philosophy of language, and, particularly, to a Gricean, semantics-geared, communication model, pragmatic outlook. The fourth step sets out a critique of pragmatic formalism from the standpoint of pragmatic realism. The fifth, and final, step outlines the proposal side of pragmatic realism, as a pragmatic theory of judicial interpretation.

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Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di GiurisprudenzaUniversità di GenovaGenovaItaly

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