Advertisement

Frames v. Containers

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
Chapter
Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS, volume 128)

Abstract

The chapter proceeds in the exploration of the dispute between interpretive cognitivism (“formalism”) and non-cognitivism (“realism”) from a further vantage point. It considers and compares two competing theories concerning the notions of legal interpretation and of general norms of written-law. These are the frame of interpretations theory and the container-retrieval theory—the latter, as we shall see, in a conventional linguistic meaning variety. Three lines of argument will be deployed to defend the frame theory from “retrievalist” critiques. To begin with, I will claim that it is immune from the pretended capital flaw of being unable to allow for a clear-cut distinction between explicit norms (the norms representing the meaning of a legal provision) and implicit norms (the norms “without provision” representing the un-expressed, tacit, content of the law). Furthermore, I will claim that it is also immune from a second, pretended capital flaw: i.e., its alleged inability to discriminate between legal orders where legislation is a source of law and legal orders where legislation is not a source of law. Finally, I will argue that, as a theory of written norms, interpretation and argumentation, the frame theory enjoys of a competitive advantage over the rival theory, on four grounds: juristic commonsense, contemporary pragmatics, ideological neutrality, and conceptual adequacy. As a whole, the chapter purports to add another, third, link to the argument for a realistic, construction conception of legal meaning.

References

  1. Bulygin E (1991 [1994]) On Legal Interpretation. In: Koch H-J, Neumann U (eds) Praktische Vernunft und Rechtsanwendung / Legal system and practical reason, ARSP-Beiheft 53. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart, pp 11–22Google Scholar
  2. Carrió GR (1965) Notas sobre derecho y lenguaje. Abeledo-Perrot, Buenos AiresGoogle Scholar
  3. Chiassoni P (2013) Wiener realism. In: Duarte d’Almeida L, Gardner J, Green L (eds) Kelsen revisited. Hart, Oxford, pp 131–162Google Scholar
  4. Diciotti E (2013) Norme espresse e norme inespresse. Sulla teoria dell’interpretazione di Riccardo Guastini. Rivista di filosofia del diritto/J Legal Philos 1:103–123Google Scholar
  5. Diciotti E (2014) Il realismo giuridico e l’interpretazione della legge. Analisi e Diritto:57–71Google Scholar
  6. Guastini R (2011a) Interpretare e argomentare. Giuffrè, MilanoGoogle Scholar
  7. Guastini R (2013) Replica. Rivista di filosofia del diritto/J Leg Philos 1:125–136Google Scholar
  8. Hart HLA (1961) The concept of law. Third edition, with a Postscript edited by PA Bulloch and J Raz, And with an introduction and notes by L. Green. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013Google Scholar
  9. Hart HLA (1967 [1983]) Problems of the philosophy of law. In: Hart HLA (ed) Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 88–119CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Hart HLA (1977 [1983]) American jurisprudence through English Eyes: the Nightmare and the Noble Dream. In: Hart HLA (ed) Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 123–143Google Scholar
  11. Hart HLA (1983a) Introduction. In: Hart HLA (ed) Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Hart HLA (1983b) Essays in jurisprudence and philosophy. Clarendon Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Kelsen H (1960) Reine Rechtslehre, 2nd edn. Deuticke Wien [eng. tr. The pure theory of law. The University of California Press, Berkeley, and Los Angeles, 1967]Google Scholar
  14. Pino G (2013) Interpretazione cognitiva, interpretazione decisoria, interpretazione creative. Rivista di filosofia del diritto/J Leg Philos 1:77–101Google Scholar
  15. Raz J (2009) Between authority and interpretation. On the theory of law and practical reason. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Soames S (2007) Interpreting legal texts: what is, and what is not, special about the law. Paper presented at “An International Conference on Law, Language, and Interpretation”, University of Akureyri, Akureyri, Iceland, April 1–2, 2007Google Scholar
  17. Velluzzi V (2013a) Introduzione. Rivista di filosofia del diritto/J Legal Philos 1:73–76Google Scholar
  18. Velluzzi V (ed) (2013b) Interpretazione e costruzione del diritto. Riflessioni su Interpretare e argomentare di Riccardo Guastini. Rivista di filosofia del diritto/J Legal Philos 1:73–136Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pierluigi Chiassoni
    • 1
  1. 1.Dipartimento di GiurisprudenzaUniversità di GenovaGenovaItaly

Personalised recommendations